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Abstract
Every nation wants to achieve Universal Access of telecommunication services due to its importance to the economy 
and national life. Unfortunately in sub-Saharan Africa, telecommunication services are either scarce or non-existent in 
rural areas. However, previous telecommunication policies have enabled the provision of various network technologies 
in Africa. What type of policy is needed to push these telecommunication services into rural areas? This paper discusses 
the importance of issuing a using Free Spectrum policy to as an incentive to small telecom network operators in Africa. 
Ghana is used as a test case.
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Introduction
This article is about the use of free spectrum as an 
incentive to cheaper telecom network providers to invest 
in rural areas of sub-Saharan Africa. The African country 
used as a test here is Ghana. The prime motive of every 
business man is to make profit in any venture he pursues. 
Whereas the role of the public sector is to provide public 
goods in which telecommunications is one of them. The 
current trend in policy making has been to find common 
grounds by which private interest will interoperate 
with public interest to provide public good. One of the 
policy initiatives very critical to attracting private sector 
participation is the provision of market incentives by the 
public sector in the telecommunication industry. These 
market incentives are aimed at facilitating the demand 
and supply side of telecommunication services. For the 
public sector, its aim is to ensure universal access of 
telecommunications and the private sector is seen as a 
tool to achieving this fit because of budgetary shortfalls in 
providing infrastructure in all areas of the economy (The 
free dictionary by Farlex, 2011). For the private investor 
these market incentives give room for the reduction of 
operational cost as well as other transaction costs as he 
enters the market. It makes the market attractive for 
the private sector. The reduction of cost, coupled with 
other factors like competition will eventually enable the 
subscribers of the public good to access the good at a 
reasonable cost. 
However, even though the result of the above narrated 
relationship is always aimed at by policy makers, the reality 
on ground is always far from the most desired expectations. 
Taking Sub-Saharan Africa as an example, the outcome of 
many telecommunication policies few years down the line 
has presented a new challenge which affects the ultimate 
aim of attaining Universal access of telecommunications 
services. While policy makers and the various stakeholders 
have been able to facilitate broad telecommunications 
coverage in commercially viable areas, the rural areas 
and the non- commercially viable areas experience 
little or no coverage at all. The economic disparity 
experienced by the two groups in a sub-Saharan African 
country makes the dream of reduced operational and 
transaction cost in rural areas difficult. Telecom network 
operators deploy telecommunication infrastructure 
at a huge cost hence attracting a return on investment 
in rural areas becomes a difficult mountain to climb.
With this challenge, it is imperative to look at innovative ways 
of either strengthening existing policy measures through 
innovative policies or come up with new policy initiatives 
that will enable the penetration of telecommunication 
services in rural areas.  The main crux of new policies 
has to centre on different ways that will influence the 
reduction of cost of deployment of infrastructure. 
Secondly, there are different type of telecom network 
technologies under the Mobile and fixed network 
categories of network technologies. Policy makers have to 
do cost benefit analysis to ascertain which type of network 
technology can be deployed at a cheaper cost in rural areas. 
Presently in cosmopolitan areas of sub-Saharan Africa, the 
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), the 
Universal Mobile Telecommunications Service (UMTS) and 
the High Speed Packet Access technologies (HSPA) family 
of mobile network technologies are ubiquitous. Other 
network technologies like WiMAX, Wi-Fi, and VSAT 
etc. are used in a small scale compared to the ubiquitous 
technologies. It is necessary to find out which technology 
if deployed will reduce the cost of access by the subscriber.
Previous policy initiatives have enabled some interesting 
scenarios. In a study conducted on the Ghanaian 
telecommunications sector, there is a picture that reflects 
the situation in other African countries. There are 
more Wi-Fi, VSAT operators than the GSM and UMTS 
operators. Certain policy factors enable this phenomenon 
(Frempong, 2001). The reason is simple, the market entry 
requirements for the GSM and UMTS operators in Africa 
is much higher than that of the Wi-Fi operators. This 
is because there are certain restrictions to the number 
of GSM operators that the regulatory authority of a 
country can allow based on their strategic, technical and 
economic interests. But for the Wi-Fi etc. operators, their 
operation is downstream hence their entry requirement 
is much lower because it promotes ICTs at the grass root. 
This makes the use of Wi-Fi, VSAT, WiMAX etc. more 
likely technologies that can be used for rural areas. And 
nowadays WiMAX and Wi-Fi and other technologies 
can be used as an overlay to a GSM network to extend 
coverage to rural areas. Another cheaper initiative is the 
use of Wi-Fi point-to-point link using Line-of-Sight ranges 
as a backhaul transmission link into an interior with no 
alternative backhaul transmission link.
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It is imperative to realign new policy thoughts in line 
with these developments to serve the rural areas. In 
this article, discussion will centre on how unlicensed 
spectrum can be used as incentive for local Wireless 
Access Network providers as an incentive to invest in 
rural areas in Ghana. The significance of this article is to 
contribute to the discussion of using unlicensed spectrum 
to facilitate rural telecommunication penetration. If the 
cost of licencing and spectrum is removed, it will attract 
investors to invest in rural areas, knowing that the 
recurring cost of regulatory charges and spectrum fees 
is out of the way. The cost of deploying technologies like 
Wi-Fi will be reduced over time and the cost of access to 
the service by the villager will also reduce. Ghana is used 
as a test study because of the infrastructure it has in place 
from the International bandwidth to the last mile and the 
potential for implementing this policy. Secondly, Ghana’s 
rural areas do have the same features as many rural areas 
in many sub-Saharan countries.
The outline of the article is as follows. Under the theoretical 
discussion, the role of market incentive in facilitating the 
telecommunications market and the different forms of 
spectrum administration and allocation are discussed. 
The main methods used for gathering data and the results 
gathered from these methods are also included in this 
article. Finally, the discussion centres on the rational for 
free spectrum as a market incentive for small network 
operators to operate in rural Ghana.
Market incentives and the telecommunications 
market
Market incentives have been used in many African 
countries to facilitate the telecommunication markets in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Many incentives have been used over 
the years to stimulate the diffusion of telecommunication 
services. Tax incentives is one of them, Nigeria in 2001, 
Nigeria granted 5 years tax holiday incentives to four 
new mobile network operators who were pioneers in the 
country (Bankole, 2009). One of the aims of the incentive 
was the reduction of initial cost of deploying infrastructure 
in the country. In 2001 Nigeria had 266 461 mobile 
subscribers in the first year of implementing the 5 year tax 
holiday. In 2005, five years later, the number of subscribers 
grew to 18, 295, 896 subscribers (NCC, 2011). In 2005 
Universal Licence was granted to all telecommunication 
operators with only a single licence offering. That moved 
the active number of telecommunication operators from 
8 to 25 (Bilesanmi, 2011). Currently 20 are operating. 
Today, the number of mobile telephony subscribers has 
grown to 103, 347, 158 subscribers (NCC, 2011).  Ghana, 
Mozambique and Uganda allow free repatriation of profits, 
and tax incentives to foreign companies, this includes 
foreign network operators (FDI, 1999). These have 
equally made their markets attractive to foreign network 
providers. However, quite unlike Nigeria, Ghana, Uganda 
and Mozambique do not have major indigenous network 
providers. However, this market incentive has attracted 
major investments into the market. In Ghana there is 
stiff competition between MTN and Millicom Ghana ltd 
(Tigo), both are subsidiaries of South African and a United 
States based company. Due to the financial incentive 
of repatriation of profits, the companies are in stiff 
competition to gain more subscribers which eventually 
translates to more money. Ghana has a population of almost 
24 Million citizens (Ghana Statistical Service, 2010).  By 
December 2010 Ghana had 17 436 949 mobile telephone 
subscribers. MTN had 8 721 249 subscribers while Tigo 
brand could boast of 3 999 262 mobile subscribers (NCA, 
2011). The other network operators had a combination of 
8 316 438 subscriptions in their books.  If all Ghanaians 
were to own one mobile telephone per person, it would 
mean that Universal Access would almost be achieved by 
the rate at which the competition is going.
Another form of incentive deployed in Africa is 
infrastructure development. Although Africa still has 
a deficit of infrastructure development, many African 
countries have made effort to provide telecommunication 
infrastructure. In Ghana, the government has liberalised 
infrastructure delivery. Today there are private companies 
involved separately in the development of international, 
national and last mile bandwidth in Ghana (Ghana 
Connect, 2010). This has enabled competition already in 
the broadband market. In Nigeria, MTN and GLO Mobile 
is also involved in the development of national bandwidth. 
Similar initiatives also took place in South Africa. The 
competition in the development and deployment of 
national bandwidth encourages innovation and the 
reduction in the cost of access to broadband by ISPs, 
Companies and homes, depending on who the subscriber 
to the service is. This has led to the reduction in the cost 
of broadband. In Ghana, the cost of access of accessing a 
fibre optic network for broadband has reduced from US 
$4500 to US $2100 monthly (myitghana, 2010).
Market incentives are really important, even though they 
may not always present the required result. However 
they will produce some results.
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Different forms of licencing and spectrum 
allocation
It is important to look at the theory of the proposed market 
incentive and to explain why the choice of unlicensed 
commons is adopted for this article. Deregulation is 
the removal or simplification of government rules and 
regulations that constrain the operation of market forces 
(Sullivan etal, 2002). The general idea is that few or no 
regulations has the potential to raise competition, enhance 
higher productivity, enhance efficiency which will in turn 
lead to low prices for the consumer. In telecommunications, 
one of the most important components of market entry 
is spectrum and licence acquisition. This can be done 
separately or together depending on each country. One 
of the reasons spectrum is regulated is because it is a 
scarce resource. Its demand is often higher than the 
supply. Hence to enhance technical efficiency of allocated 
spectrum it is often regulated. In a monopolistic market, 
spectrum was granted as state concession. However in a 
competitive market, technical efficiency alone is not the 
only reason why regulation is needed, spectrum regulation 
is another way of regulating the competition ensuing in 
the telecommunications market. This is because of the 
uneven network capacities of the competitors in the 
market. So to ensure fairness regulation is needed.
However, regulation of spectrum can either be by command 
and control, use of market mechanisms or unlicensed 
commons (Openspectrum, 2011) (Satapathy and Peha, 1996). 
For the command and control, a regulator decides on the 
use and assignment of spectrum. For the market control, 
spectrum is sold in the free market and for the unlicensed 
commons, spectrum is granted without any licence.
Command and control is the most common practice in 
many countries. Under this practice licences are either 
allocated via auctions, public tenders (beauty contest), 
and the lottery or on a first come first serve basis (Falch, 
2010). Generally the auction is preferred by governments 
as millions of dollars are accrued by governments as a 
result of potential network providers competing to out-
bid each other. The Spectrum allocation is part of the 
licence fee of operation. With the market mechanism 
scheme, the regulatory authority in many cases do grant 
permission to licence holders to either trade with their 
licences or carry out any form of exchange or rent of 
unused spectrum by the network operator to another 
network operator. However, some regulatory bodies 
practice the combination of the three licence regulatory 
models for different network technologies being regulated 
in the country. This depends on the technology the sector 
regulator intends to promote at a particular time. In many 
countries, regulators grant preference to certain based 
mostly on their ability to attract returns in terms of taxes 
and other forms of revenue to the government of the day. 
Spectrum in many cosmopolitan areas is scarce. However 
in rural areas, there are lots of unused spectrums. 
However, even though spectrum is a scarce resource it 
has been discovered that much of the allocated spectrum 
sit idle at any given time whenever a system is not 
transmitting. Hence Spectrum sharing has been proposed 
as a solution of solving scarcity (Peha, 2011). It is a way 
of sharing spectrum without causing excessive harmful 
interference with traffic from competing operators. With 
this technique competing operators can share spectrum, 
giving room to more traffic. With this new technique 
in place is it still necessary to adopt the Command and 
control and the market control as a way of ensuring 
universal Access?
There has been no clear cut consensus of what model of 
regulation or what combination of models of regulation 
should be adopted to either enhance or substitute the 
popular Command and control model. There have been 
suggestions on what form of innovative policy can be 
used in the light of the new challenge of new wireless 
systems that require spectrum. Matheson and Morris 
(2011) are encouraging the free market approach based 
on the inefficiencies of the command and control. The 
inefficiencies are borne out of the growing number of 
new technologies in the market competing for spectrum. 
They advise that regulators partition the spectrum 
across the dimension of space, time, frequency, and 
direction of propagation. The regulators will proceed to 
sell their rights to operators who will buy, sell or sub-
divide their partitions to enhance efficiency. The duty 
of the regulator will then be to maintain a database and 
a signal propagation model that facilitates transaction 
and enforcement. Satapathy and Peha (1996) noted 
that the unlicensed Commons and the Command and 
control are similar when it comes to spectrum sharing. 
They noted a lot of differences but one is important for 
this article. One is free spectrum and the other is paid 
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for. In their submission, they threw the option of choice 
open while analysing the possible merits and demerits of 
unlicensed spectrum sharing. Licencing has been touted 
as a safe guard to ensuring quality. Svorny (1999) made an 
analysis of effect of licencing quality in different sectors 
of the economy. She queried the effect of licencing in on 
the quality of product delivered. In her analysis, high cost 
of entry was inimical to the entry of diverse players that 
would engender competition and innovation. Hence quality 
of service or product is affected as the existing service 
providers have no incentive to raise the bar especially if 
they are enjoying economics of scale.  Although she had 
a broader outlook on policy and market entry, the same 
idea can be applied in the telecommunications industry. 
The unlicensed common’s model has received great criticism 
from various sectors of the industry. The great question arises 
from the reliability aspect of an unlicensed spectrum. The 
issues of crowded interference, self-interference and costly 
network rips have been sighted as possible bottle necks to 
this fresh proposition on ground (Satapathy and Peha, 1996).
These misgivings have not stopped industry players 
from giving the idea a try. In the area of rural telephony, 
there have been the calls for the use of unlicensed 
spectrum. Recently there is a pilot test project by 
Townes telecommunications Inc. using a technology 
from xG Technologies Incorporated called xMax which 
will be initially deployed in Lewisville, Ark., as part of a 
test to gain Rural Utilities Service (RUS) certification, but 
Townes also plans to use the system in many of its other 
rural properties in Texas, Kansas, Pennsylvania, Colorado, 
Arkansas, Missouri and Florida (Wilson, 2011). The xMax 
uses cognitive radio that samples the airwaves to identify 
and use the best free channel and frequency band available 
at any given second. The pilot test of a new wireless system 
is designed to let rural carriers use unlicensed spectrum 
to offer mobile and fixed voice, text and, ultimately, 
broadband data service. Botswana is another country 
where Internet service providers use unlicensed spectrum 
band. In their own case they had a result, the number 
of broadband subscribers have increased due to cost 
reduction from using free spectrum (Openspectrum, 2011).
In this article, focus is not placed on the technical efficiency 
of the unlicensed spectrum or the removal of licence fees 
as an entry impediment. The focus is on how; the removal 
of licence and spectrum regulations for small business 
entrepreneurs can bring down the cost of deploying 
cheap network technologies like Wi-Fi in rural areas. In 
Ghana which is the test study here, Ghana does not need 
to lower the entry cost for bigger telecommunication 
networks because it will not be significant to their cost of 
operation. Hence the cost of going to the rural areas to 
deploy will still be high. But if the entry requirements for 
the small network operators who can start small Wi-Fi, 
Vsat companies in villages can be removed as an incentive, 
then investing in these villages will be a catchy idea. 
Method
The case study investigation was on Ghana’s 
telecommunications industry. Most of the results collated 
are results of earlier researches done by the author as 
well as the research done for this paper. The results for 
the earlier researches were not part of the research 
report. However they are used here because they are 
relevant to the discussion at hand.
An investigation was carried by reviewing literature and 
fieldwork using unofficial interviews with a few small 
network operators and ICT policy specialists. The aim 
of using these tools of investigation was to assess the 
entry trends of telecommunication providers in Ghana, 
their cost of acquiring spectrum and licenses. There was 
further investigation into the current trend in getting 
license for low cost technologies, spectrum fees, and 
regulatory fees to see how this affected market entry to 
the Ghanaian telecommunications market. Comparative 
analyses were made on the market entry requirements 
of both major and small network operators. The aim 
was to find out the effect of the respective market entry 
procedures in encouraging more service providers to 
invest telecommunications sector in Ghana. Further 
investigations were also made on the cost of deploying 
the major networks and the small networks in Ghana. The 
aim of this investigation was to find out if the proposed 
market incentive of Free spectrum alone would encourage 
local entrepreneurs to invest in rural areas. Information 
from that  on the startup of major telecommunication 
networks in Ghana was a bit sketch, however information 
on the upgrade from 2G to 3G mobile technologies 
in Ghana gave an insight as to how much could have 
been spent in deploying the infrastructures.. These 
investigations allowed the researcher to identify the 
effect of market entry requirements in Ghana and how 
a further market incentive policy of free spectrum to 
small network operators can encourage small network 
provider to invest in rural Ghana. 
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Results 
Table 1 Cost of Spectrum/license for 2nd Generation mobile telephony license/ Data from Wikinvest (2009), Goschen (2007),
Tables 1, and 2, are extrapolated from documentations from 
network operators, news dailies and NCA’s annual reports. 
Table 3 is extrapolated from NCA’s website. Before making 
a case for the removal of the cost of licenses for cheaper 
technologies, it was important to investigate the cost of 
licenses for the major network technologies in Ghana.
From table 1, the least cost paid for 2nd generation license/





Millicom Gh Ltd  22.5  
Kasapa (now Expresso)  22.5  
!
spectrum in Ghana was US$22.5 Million (Goschen, 2007). 
The amount of US$50 million paid by GLO mobile is not for 
the 2nd generation License/spectrum alone but for the 3rd 
Generation license/spectrum as well (Yeboah, 2008). They 
are a new entrant so they bought both in a public tender. 
The amount was paid to the National Communications 
Authority (NCA), Ghana’s telecommunications 
regulator. Each license was granted for 15 years. 
3G Operator  (Cost) US$ Million 
License/Spectrum GLO  GLO paid $50 Million 
The rest paid NCA a combined 
amount of GH!43.6 Million 








Table 2 Cost of Spectrum/license for 3rd Generation mobile telephony license / Data from NCA Annual Report (2010), 
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From table 2, It was difficult to get the actual amount paid 
by each operator for a third generation Mobile telephony 
license. However from the NCA report the combined 
amount was GH 43.6 (Ghana cedi) which is equivalent 
to US$28.8 million for 15 years. The combined spectrum 
cost is cheap; however the cost of upgrade is high at 
$120 million. Huawei technologies got the contract for 
both MTN and Vodafone (Ghana News Agency, 2006. 
Field, 2009). MTN and ZAIN have deployed High Speed 
Download Packet Access (HSDPA). GLO is yet to 
commence operation, while Millicom (Tigo) has deployed 
3G. There was no information on Expresso.
VSAT/WiFi Specification Cost
Spectrum regulatory charges Industrial Scientific and Medical radio  band 
2GHz band (2.4000- 2.4830) and 5.8 GHz 
band (5.77-5.850)
$300 per region 
Point-Point microwave link with bandwidth 
!14MHz
$1000
Point-Point microwave link with bandwidth "
14MHz
($1000)
Point Ð multi- Point microwave link 2x1Mhz  ($3000 per region) 
Regulatory fee 
VSAT for public use (Urban) Application fee $1000
Authorization charges  $2000
Annual regulatory fee  $2000 per year per site 




Annual regulatory fee $250 per site per year 
VSAT network (DTH) Application fee $1500
Authorization charges  $20000
Annual regulatory fee  $15000
! Table 3 Spectrum and regulatory charges for VSAT/WiFi services and equipments/ Data from NCA (2011)
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The data from table 3 shows glaringly the wide disparity in 
the spectrum and regulatory charges for VSAT and WiFi 
operators in Ghana. It is also important to note that the 
regulatory charge for the Microwave link is also applicable 
to the fixed and mobile network operators who paid huge 
entry fee to join the Ghanaian telecommunications market. 
Hence since mobile networks use microwave links as one 
of their last mile infrastructure they have to pay US$3000 
for an area they want to penetrate. Please do note that 
these payments are one time payments unless otherwise 
stated as annual payments. However, the government 
of Ghana has reduced the annual regulatory charge for 
rural termination of VSAT services. Unfortunately as, it 
will be discussed later, it is still not enough incentive to 
encourage the entrepreneurs to go into the rural areas.




Fixed Line Service 
Operators
33 Some ISPs and companies 
use VSAT
6 At least 82 2 
!
Table 4 Result of the a summary of ICT companies / Data from Business Ghana Directory (2011)
Table 4 shows a summary of an estimated number of ICT 
companies in Ghana. The market incentive seen in table 
1 and 2 are less favorable to local entrepreneurs due to 
lack of capacity. The market incentive in table 3 enables 
local entrepreneurs to join the telecommunications 
market. Hence you have more Cyber Café operators and 
ISPs who are down the value chain than the foreign major 
network operators.
!
Item Approximate cost $ 
Renting an office premises  $2000.
Bandwidth retransmission 2Mbps $7000. 
Licensing fees 2.4GHz to 
5Ghz
$300 -$500 per region 
Table 5 Sample cost implications of establishing an Internet Service Providers in Ghana/ Data extrapolated from Dogbevi (2008)
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In Ghana the average start-up cost for a small internet 
Service Provider is between approximately US$ 10000 
and US$ 15000 (Dogbevi, 2008).
Discussion
In Ghana, the cost of spectrum is embedded as part of the 
price for the licence. To buttress the argument for free 
spectrum for small network operators as an incentive 
to invest in rural areas, it was necessary to identify the 
spectrum requirements for the major and small network 
operators. Tables 1 and 2 represents data indicating 
how much each network operator paid for 2G and 3 G 
licences. While table 3 represents data on how much it 
costs for smaller network operators to acquire licence in 
Ghana. Wi-Fi operators use in most cases frequencies at 
the 2GHz range of spectrum. It is important to note that 
operators in Ghana for both private and public networks 
use either Wi-Fi with Powerline communications. There 
are different scenarios where these technologies are used 
either alone or in combination with other networks. In 
some other cases, Wi-Fi point to point links are used as 
the backhaul for the network. Another scenario abound 
where VSAT or Internet Protocol is used to link the 
existing Wi-Fi network with the outside world. The data 
from the (NCA) indicates that the amount of money 
operators pay for spectrum to transmit VSAT, Wi-Fi 
services in Ghana is far less than 1% of the total amount 
paid for 2G and 3G licences. A VSAT service in an urban 
area attracts a licencing fee of $5000 when the licencing 
free, regulatory fee and the authorization fee are lumped 
up together. Similar service in the rural area attracts 
$1250 annually. This is a far cry from the $22Million paid by 
GSM operators. The NCA allocated the 3G spectrum and 
licence at a reduced rate but it has still not made an impact 
on rural penetration of telecommunication services.
The difference in the impact in the market entry procedure 
between the 2G /3G entry and that of the smaller network 
technologies can be seen in table 4. There are more ISPs 
than mobile and fixed network operators. Although an 
argument may be made that market entry requirements 
alone may not be the only reason for the small number 
of fixed and mobile operators. However, in Ghana as well 
as other countries in the world it is difficult to find many 
bidders bidding to roll out a GSM or UMTS network in 
a country. They are usually few and many at times it is 
the multinational telecommunication companies with 
significant financial might and technical expertise that bid 
for these licences. Many relatively small companies don’t 
bid because of the huge financial commitment it requires. 
However, the positive externalities of these GSM and 
UMTS networks enable the downstream sector where 
we have ISPs, content providers, service aggregators etc. 
Hence market entry plays a role in having that small number.
However, the argument for a free spectrum wouldn’t be 
valid if the cost of starting up a small network was not 
considered. In Ghana, the most ubiquitous small network 
provider is the ISP. In rural areas, setting up smaller 
telecentres as well as ISPs for on the spot as well as local 
area connectivity would be ideal. In South America, similar 
initiatives are dotted in rural and many at times remote 
areas. This enables these rural areas to be connected to 
the rest of the world. Table 5 is a rough estimate provided 
by ISP owners in Ghana. The estimate here is for a small ISP. 
When comparing the cost of setting up a small ISP which 
is between $10000 and $15000, to the cost of setting up 
a Radio Network Controller and upgrading software in 
order to upgrade a GSM network to a UMTS network. It 
is less than 1% of the cost. In Ghana MTN and Vodafone 
paid Huawei $120 million to upgrade their networks. 
Having read this analysis so far, one may be tempting to 
say the market incentives given to the small networks are 
alright as it is. The cost of entry is low; the cost of setting 
up a small network is low what else is needed? As stated 
earlier in this article, the rural areas aren’t commercially 
viable. However in the cities, there are small challenges 
as well. At the moment Iburst , An ISP sells the cheapest 
Modem at GHC139 Ghana Cedi  (US$91.7) and pre-paid 
vouchers for 220MB with GHC 20 (US$13.19) of free 
traffic. The antennas needed for wireless laptops sell 
between $15 and $70. Their cheapest reload voucher is 
GHC 50 Ghana Cedi (US$32.9) and the highest is GHC 
200 Ghana Cedi (US$131.9) (Iburst Africa, 2011).  In the 
cities many can’t afford these services, hence they visit 
internet cafes that retail an hour of access to the internet 
at an average cost of GHC 1 Ghana Cedi (US$0.65).  The 
inability for a lot of people to afford the service is because 
many Ghanaians in the cities survive on minimum wage 
and the cost of access to credit is high. The daily minimum 
wage in Ghana is GHC 3.73 Ghana Cedi (US$ 2.46) (Ghana 
News Agency, 2011). In a month a minimum wage worker 
earns GHC 111.9 Ghana Cedi ($US 74). The average 
interest rate for credit from the bank is 25% (Gtbank 
Ghana, 2011). Hence the small telecommunications 
provider grapples with paying the bank and seeking for a 
market share in a small market.
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However, if the licencing obligation is removed and free 
spectrum is granted to these small telecommunications 
providers, the annual recurring expenditure of paying for 
spectrum, regulatory fee and renewal of licencing can be 
used as an incentive to attract them into the rural areas. In 
the rural areas, real estate is far cheaper than those in the 
cities. This only applies to renting. Hence a small network 
provider will not be paying an equivalent of $2000. With 
free spectrum granted, the amount of money saved from 
paying for spectrum and rent will enable the small operator 
build a small Wi-Fi network that will cater for a small 
village for a start. The network provider doesn’t need 
fibre optic back-bone. A Wi-Fi back bone can be used 
instead. Small telecentres can be provided by the small 
network provider to grant access to villagers who can’t 
afford customer premise equipment at a lower cost. This 
will not require a huge capital from the banks because the 
existing network provider is only expanding his reach with 
a small rural network. Some existing small operators with 
a good financial balance sheet can conveniently deploy the 
network without borrowing from the bank.
The free spectrum incentive will enable many small 
operators to deploy small networks in rural areas and 
even compete among themselves in the provision of the 
services. In other parts of the world there are similar 
cheap Wi-Fi initiatives that have succeeded even though 
free spectrum was not used as an incentive to lower the 
cost of diffusion and adoption of the service. In Bolivia, 
there are 3 overlapping Wi-Fi hotspots at Sopachuy, a 
rural area of 1500 people (Townsend and Stern, 2006). 
The hotspots support data, computer based telephony 
and VOIP. Each Wi-Fi transceiver has an individual Internet 
Protocol Address which can be controlled and managed 
by any operator anywhere in the world. There is another 
similar network at an Amazonian region of Ecuador called 
Yachana. Here instead of using Wi-Fi point to point 
network, VSAT is used to connect the Mesh to the outside 
world. At the Chancay – Huarai Valley, North of Peru, 
there is a similar network covering 22 hectares of land. 
The area is covered by 12 Wi-Fi backbone links and the 
cost of each tower, antenna and radio equipment at each 
site was between US$ 1200 and US$1500 (Townsend and 
Stern, 2006). Assuming an average of US$1500 was spent 
per site, and then $18000 was used to set up the network. 
However, these possibilities can be fast tracked in rural 
Ghana and rural Africa at large if free spectrum will 
be granted as an incentive to entrepreneurs willing to 
invest in the rural areas. The possibilities facilitated by 
these technologies require a fundamental shift from 
governments. A lot of money is made by governments 
from taxes on both major and small network operators, 
spectrum licences, regulatory fees, interconnectivity, 
termination charges etc. Relinquishing free spectrum as 
an incentive for rural telecommunication development 
will go a long way in promoting the socio- economic well-
being of the rural areas.  E-commerce, E- governance, E- 
health and E-education are various possibilities by which 
rural dwellers can benefit from using ICTs. And most 
importantly, as the economy of the rural areas picks up, 
major networks will feel confident to come in and invest.
With Free Spectrum for small network operators, the cost 
of deployment of the service will reduce even further to 
the level in which the rural dweller will be able to afford 
the telecommunication service.
This test carried on Ghana in this article is very possible to 
implement in rural areas of sub-Saharan Africa. Universal 
Access of telecommunication services is possible in Africa 
if the right market incentive is adopted to encourage the 
private sector to invest and make profit.
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